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RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHYY/GENEVA CD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
GIPNC/GLOBAL INITIATIVE PARTNER NATIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNSTF/TERRORISM FINANCE PRE NOTIFICATION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 4304  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0001  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1589  
RUEHUVN/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0163  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0539

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000069

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR P (BURNS, MULL), EUR/ERA (DEAN), EUR/WE (MCKNIGHT, ZERDECKI), ISN (ELIOT KANG), ISN/RA (NEPHEW, ALLEN-CLOSE, MONGIELLO), ISN/MNSA (DAVIS), NEA (CATALANO), IO/GS (DETEMPLE)  
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (RYU, MAGSAMEN, HOLGATE, CONNERY, SAMORE, BRADLEY)  
FOR USUNVIE/IAEA  
FOR USEU (SIDHU)

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UNSC

SUBJECT: SPAIN INCREASINGLY LIKE-MINDED ON ADDITIONAL IRAN SANCTIONS

REF: A. 09 MADRID 1240  
[B.](#) 09 MADRID 1196  
[C.](#) 09 MADRID 1133  
[D.](#) 09 MADRID 1087  
[E.](#) 09 MADRID 1006

Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

[¶](#)1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Ambassador Stephen Mull, Special Advisor to P, on January 15 briefed Spanish diplomats regarding key updates in the USG's engagement track with Iran and the need to begin focusing on a UNSC resolution for additional sanctions if Tehran refuses to engage. Mull emphasized the need for the USG and Spain - as rotating EU President during the first half of 2010 - to coordinate closely on this issue. The Spanish reacted positively to the USG proposals on the types of new sanctions that could be implemented (see Septel), stated that the USG can count on Spain's full support as EU President, and invited Mull to return to Spain for further talks. Post has ramped up its engagement with Spain on the Iranian nuclear issue in recent months (see Refs) and notes the MFA's stance has evolved into a more supportive policy for additional sanctions. Spanish officials who just a few months ago were skeptical on the value of additional sanctions - especially if done without the umbrella of a new UNSC resolution - are now telling the U.S. that they are in sync with USG contingency plans for targeted unilateral sanctions and, as EU President, are willing to cooperate in whatever way they can. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT:

[¶](#)2. (U) Mull spoke with Carmen Bujan, Director General (DG,

A/S-level) for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, and Fidel Sendagorta, DG for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and Near East, who were joined by Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, Special Ambassador for Disarmament, and Gonzalo de Salazar, Deputy DG for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

//Bujan: "The U.S. Can Count on Us"//

¶3. (C) Bujan agreed on the timing to have the UNSC begin debating additional sanctions in February under the French leadership of the UNSC, noting that beginning this debate early in 2009 could help to make progress on the issue. She indicated her preference for debating and resolving the Iran sanctions issue by April to prevent the matter from being a front-burner issue in May, when it could detract from efforts to hold a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

¶4. (C) Bujan suggested that the level of ambition at the UNSC regarding a possible resolution will hinge a great deal on how much the U.S. and Russia see eye to eye and opined that China would be unlikely to use a veto that would put it at odds with all other P5 members. Bujan then remarked that if the level of ambition at the UNSC is not high, then others such as the EU would step forward to support additional sanctions. She stated that, with London and Paris prodding Madrid, Spain - as EU President - "would not be shy about matching" the USG's enhanced unilateral sanctions designed to avoid harm to the Iranian people. Bujan said that the USG can count on the support of Spain as EU President for whatever we need.

//Sendagorta: Support for Various Types of Additional Sanctions//

¶5. (C) Sendagorta began his remarks by stating that President Obama's policy of engagement with Iran has been very well received by the Zapatero Administration, which also agrees that there has to be some kind of deadline to this outreach if Tehran continues to choose not to engage. Describing the Islamic Republic of Iran as an opaque regime whose specialty is engaging in talks in bad faith just to drag out negotiations and buy time, Sendagorta argued that the international community cannot allow Tehran to stall any further because the "nuclear clock is ticking."

¶6. (C) On the prospect of additional sanctions, Sendagorta assessed, "Some action is better than no action at this point, that's for sure" although he questioned whether the sanctions would achieve their economic goal. The important thing is that they would show the international community is united and that the threat of sanctions is not a bluff. In response to Mull's overview of the types of sanctions the USG is currently considering, Sendagorta responded, "We can go along with many of these ideas." Sendagorta asserted that the key is how the international community can help the Iranian people, "especially those who think like us." He opined that additional sanctions "do not have to be very destructive right now" and suggested that perhaps being more demanding of Tehran on human rights issues - and keeping these demands separate from the nuclear issue - could be an effective strategy. He admitted that the Iranian public's reaction to increased sanctions remains an unknown and acknowledged that they could even backfire by awakening popular support for the regime.

¶7. (C) Sendagorta appreciated word of USG efforts to convey to Asian countries - such as China - the importance of not seeking to profit on new market opportunities that would arise if the US and EU implemented additional unilateral sanctions. He also expressed concern about the Gulf countries, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. He related a story in which Zapatero traveled to Saudi Arabia in November ¶2009. According to Sendagorta, the Saudi King urged Zapatero to be "extremely aggressive" against Iran, to which Zapatero replied that Spain was ready to do so, but when Spain inquired what Saudi Arabia was prepared to do eliminate export control loopholes regarding its trade with Iran, the

King said nothing, which Sendagorta found very disturbing.

¶ 8. (C) Following a question by Bujan to Mull on how best to engage with Israel to calm tensions in the region, Sendagorta told Mull that Spain constantly tells Israel that it understands the threat that Iran's nuclear program poses to Israel and assures Israel that Spain will do its part to help resolve the issue. Sendagorta further stated that Spain tells Israel that there are things that Israel can do, too. For example, Spain tells Israel that if it entered into negotiations with the Palestinians and/or Syrians, Israel would undermine Iran's policies. Sendagorta said that Spain is currently telling Israel, "If you have cards to play, use them now."

¶ 9. (U) Ambassador Mull cleared this cable.  
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